JSD was not ready
for Nov 7 Sepoy Mutiny
SALEEM SAMAD
The
Biplobi Sainik Sangstha (Revolutionary Sepoy’s Organisation) was never heard of
in early 1970s. The clandestine organisation’s hard-core members were mostly
Junior and Non-Commissioned Officers of Bangladesh Army. The recruits of the
secret group were loyal to dismissed Maj Mohammad Abdul Jalil, Commander of
Sector 9 of Mukti Bahini.
The
secret group began its journey on January 1, 1973 at the staff quarters of
Havildar Bari of Armoured Corps. The members were drawn from serving Junior and
Non-Commissioned Officers. On the founding day of the ‘Bangladesh Revolutionary
and Suicide Commando Force’ they took solemn oath by touching the Holy Qur’an.
The
underground Biplobi Sainik Sangstha’s members held secret meetings at
Ahsanullah Hall of Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET).
The political wisdom, mission and visions of the revolution were tutored by
Sirajul Alam Khan, political theorist and founder of the Jatiya Samjtantrik Dal
(JSD) and Dr Akhlaqur Rahman, an economist.
Days
after Maj Jalil was imprisoned on March 17, 1974, he send secret message to the
underground organisation’s leader Corporal Altaf Hossain to contact Col Abu
Taher (Bir Uttam) and seek directives from the former commander of Sector 11.
Corporal
Hossain was the key person to organise the soldiers in various cantonments and
motivate them to join the revolution.
On
June 20, 1974, a secret meeting presided by Col Taher was organised at Sergeant
Abu Yusuf Khan’s residence at Elephant Road. The retired Sector Commander told
the dedicated group that his friend Maj Gen Ziaur Rahman, who was Deputy Chief
of Army Staff has expressed solidarity with the group and will support their
revolution.
The
statement has raised the morale of the junior officers. Since then the
activities of the Revolutionary Commando Force were held openly.
On the
other side, most soldiers of Sector 11 and loyal to Taher joined ‘Biplobi
Sainik Sangstha’ also many soldiers in Comilla Cantonment where he (Taher) once
served as Commanding Officer also joined the group. He advocated for ‘People’s
Army’ and through ‘class struggle’ drew political support of the soldiers.
Soon
the Revolutionary Commando Force and other smaller groups among the soldiers
merged into Biplobi Sainik Sangstha, after the crisis created following the
assassination of the Father of the Nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in a military
putsch.
Taher
knew his limitation and was not a protagonist of the revolution. He decided to
use Zia’s image among the soldiers to expedite the revolution. In a bid to garner
more support of the soldiers he included in the Sainik Sangstha a 12-point
demands for the realisation of 18 months of unpaid wages of repatriated
soldiers from Pakistan. This was debated by former Mukti Bahini soldiers and
was not discussed at the high command of the JSD.
Taher
also formed strategic alliance with the pro-Peking (now Beijing) left groups
and parties who participated in the Liberation War to form liberated areas in
rural regions, so that the radical groups can create pressure on the capital
Dhaka.
JSD
radical political philosophy was similar to the Sainik Sangstha revolution to
overthrow the autocratic regime to establish a pro-people, farmers, soldiers,
workers and students national government.
On
November 6, JSD party forum held an emergency standing committee meeting at a
residence in Kalabagan. The meeting was attended by Sirajul Alam Khan, Aklaqur
Rahman, Monirul Islam, Hasanul Haque Inu and Khair Ejaz Masud and others,
writes Mohiuddin Ahmed in his recent book “Jashoder Utthan Poton: Osthir
Somoyer Rajniti, Protoma Prokashon.
The
agenda for discussion was to organise an indefinite shut down (hartal). A show
down of strength was planned at Paltan Maidan on November 9. JSD leaders expected
that thousands of industrial workers from Adamjee, Tejgaon and Tongi would
participate and block the capital Dhaka for days, until the government collapse
and form a national government with all parties, minus the BAKSAL leadership.
Unfortunately the plan was abandoned, due to abrupt Sepoy Mutiny.
While
the meeting was in progress, Taher walked in and sat to listen to the discussion.
Surprisingly the Sepoy Mutiny was not in the agenda. Possibly the key leaders
had no knowledge that a mutiny was brewing.
After
a while, a young military officer in civilian dress barged into the meeting
room, without causing any alarm among the key leaders sitting there. He whispered
in the ears of Taher and handed over to him two small pieces of papers.
Once
the officer departed, Taher drew the attention of the meeting and read out one
message which came from Gen Zia. Which reads: “I am interned, I can’t take the
lead. My men are there. If you take the lead, my men will join you.”
Those
present at the meeting have never met Zia and does not know him. The first
reaction came from Akhlaqur Rahman, who refused to accept Gen Zia as their
leader. All the leaders had one question, whether Zia should be trusted? Taher
promptly responded and confidently said, “If you trust me, then you can also
trust Zia. He will be under my feet.”
He
also informed the meeting that he has instructed the Sainik Sangstha to begin
the revolution. Immediately all the members in the room were baffled by the
announcement. The meeting tried to influence Taher to withdraw the call for
mutiny. He said it was impossible to reach the decision as the communication is
a one-way traffic.
The
second message was from the command centre of the soldiers planning the mutiny at
midnight following November 6. It reads: “Khaled Mussaraf men are moving fast.
The iron is too hot. It is time to hit.”
Taher took the floor and said like what happened in the Bolshevik Revolution – Tonight or never. Sirajul Alam Khan did not say yes or no to the plan. The leaders continued to pursue Taher and frustrated the meeting abruptly ended without any plan, Mohiuddin writes.
F
Rahman Hall at Dhaka University was converted into a clandestine command centre
for the November 7 Sepoy Mutiny led by Col Abu Taher, commander of Gono Bahni
(People’s Army).
A
nervous mutineer Subedar Mehboob rang the shot an hour early than determined at
1 O’clock. The single shot at midnight from a rifle, triggered the revolution of
soldiers. Thousands of soldiers joined the mutiny broke the military armoury to
loot weapons and boarded trucks and jeeps and took control of strategic points.
A
contingent rushed to Gen Zia’s residence to free him from house-arrest in Dhaka
Cantonment hours after Maj Khaled Musharraf's coup d'etat on November 3. Taher
drove in a military jeep with few JSD leaders and met Zia. “You have saved the
nation,” he admired Taher amidst cheering soldiers.
Zia
asked Taher of the whereabouts of Sirajul Alam Khan. It was presumed that Zia
wanted to meet the top leaders of JSD, which never happened.
Since
the meeting held on the eve of November 7, Sirajul Alam Khan, Akhlaqur Rahman
and many senior leaders opted to maintain low profile. Possibly they believed
that the mutiny would fail, and it failed.
Mohiuddin
in his book writes that despite request by Taher, Zia refused to go to the
radio station on an excuse that his statement could be recorded and broadcast.
At the radio station Shamsuddin Ahmed, a young Turk of the Gana Bahini read out
a statement which announced the Sepoy Mutiny. Unfortunately, the announcer did
not mention the name of Taher or other JSD leaders or even his name.
On
November 23, 1975, Zia also ordered the arrest of JSD leaders. A large police
contingent surrounded the house of Col Taher's brother Sergeant Abu Yusuf Khan
and took him to the police control room.
When
Col Taher heard about his brother’s arrest, he rang Gen Zia but was told that
he was not available. Instead Maj Gen HM Ershad, the Deputy Chief Martial Law
Administrator, spoke with him. Ershad said it was a police matter and they knew
nothing about it, writes Talukder Maniruzzaman in “Bangladesh in 1976: Struggle
for Survival as an Independent State,” published in Asian Survey in February
1977.
The
following day Taher was arrested 16 days after freeing Ziaur Rahman and was
taken to Dhaka Central Jail. He was accused of 'instigating indiscipline' in
the army and attempting to expand the original mutiny of November 7, 1975
towards a goal of "socialist revolution" and to kill some of the army
officers.
Abu
Taher's Last Testament: Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution by Lawrence
Lifschultz published in Economic and Political Weekly, India in August 1977:
“It became very clear to me that a new conspiracy had taken control of those we
had brought to power on November 7 in 1975.”
“On
November 24, 1975, I was surrounded by a large contingent of police. The police
officer asked me to accompany him for discussion with Zia. I said I was
surprised and I asked him why there was need of a police guard for me to go to
Zia. Anyway they put me in a jeep and drove me straight to this jail. This is
how I was put inside this jail by those traitors who I saved and brought to
power.”
“In
our history, there is only one example of such treachery. It was the treachery
of Mir Zafar who betrayed the people of Bangladesh and the subcontinent and led
us into slavery for a period of 200 years. Fortunately for us it is not 1757.
It is 1976 and we have revolutionary soldiers and a revolutionary people who
will destroy the conspiracy of traitors like Ziaur Rahman,” the statement
concluded.
The
Supreme Court has recently described the execution of Taher through an order of
a military tribunal in 1976 as ‘outright murder’. It says the hanging of Taher
was ‘illegal’ and a case of ‘cold blooded assassination’.
Saleem Samnad, an Ashoka Fellow (USA) is an award winning investigative reporter based in Bangladesh. Email <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>
