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| Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina share a laughter at a joint press conference in New Delhi on April 8, 2017. (Prakash Singh/AFP/Getty Images) |
ARAFAT KABIR
At a time when China has made a considerable headway in
South Asia, the bilateral relationship between Bangladesh and India gets a
timely boost during the Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s four-day
state visit to India last week. In the presence of the prime ministers, the two
countries signed as many as 22 deals that included a separate agreement on
civil nuclear and defense cooperation, both a first between the two South Asian
neighbors. India also agreed to offer Bangladesh a $4.5 billion line of credit
on top of another $3 billion that was previously sanctioned by New Delhi.
But despite that progress, Bangladesh and India had yet to
finalize the long-awaited water share treaty over a common river, Teesta,
further deepening Dhaka’s frustration.
Initially scheduled in December last year, but canceled
twice, Hasina’s visit created a buzz in both Bangladeshi and Indian media.
Bangladeshi newspapers speculated on a possible timeframe on the Teesta water
sharing treaty, while Indian media focused their attention on the
soon-to-be-signed defense pact. Days before Hasina’s trip to Delhi, however, it
became clear that the Teesta deal was unlikely. This, in turn, stoked hype for
the Indo-Bangla defense pact.
Under the defense agreement, India will offer $500 million
to help Bangladesh acquire military hardware from India. However, it is not
clear what types of arms India will provide. Apart from this, two other
agreements were signed aiming to boost cooperation between the two nation’s
defense colleges.
Significance of a Bangladesh-India defense treaty
India wanted to sign a long-term, comprehensive defense pact
with Bangladesh. Delhi was already worried about the growing multidimensional
cooperation between Bangladesh and China.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Bangladesh in last
October took the bilateral relationship to a new height. The next month
Bangladesh’s navy received the delivery of two China-made diesel-electric
submarines. Around the same time, Delhi scaled up its effort to seal a defense
deal with Bangladesh. The underlying principle is not hard to guess: to counter
the growing Chinese influence in Bangladesh.
A series of high-profile visits by Indian officials during
the past few months in the run-up to Hasina's visit demonstrated India’s eagerness
for a military pact. But Dhaka was hesitant to sign one in the fear that such a
move might alienate China, the largest provider of Bangladesh’s military
equipment.
A comprehensive military pact is, therefore, more important
to India than it is to Bangladesh. For India, it serves two purposes. One,
India wants to give the signal to Beijing that it regards South Asia as its
zone of influence. Two, a defense deal would give a boost to Narendra Modi’s
“Make in India” campaign that aims to transform India into a leading arms
exporter. After all, India needs buyers of its indigenously-produced arms.
It turned out Bangladesh played out the scene quite
tactfully. Since Bangladesh stopped short of signing a defense pact, it won’t
alarm the Chinese. But for India, it is still an important beginning that has
the potential to end in a formal treaty, given the bittersweet history between
the two countries.
Hasina: a trusted friend to Delhi
The appropriate metaphor for India-Bangladesh relations
could be a married couple that became estranged but started patching things up
again. The mending of relations began when Sheikh Hasina’s government came to
power in 2008. Her administration took a zero-tolerance policy against domestic
extremism and those sympathetic to anti-Indian activities. Long considered a
political pawn, Dhaka handed over separatist leader Anup Chetia to Delhi
without much fuss. Dhaka also provided India with land and water transit
facility, an outstanding request from India, to transport Indian goods over the
Bangladeshi territory to India’s restive northeast region. In short, Sheikh
Hasina appeared a trusted friend to Delhi.
The friendship was tested in 2014 when no major country
except India backed up Hasina’s clinging to power through a highly-controversial
election boycotted by the major opposition parties. The political violence
before and after the election was one of the worst in Bangladesh’s history and
Hasina’s government came under international criticism. But the then-Manmohan
Singh’s government in Delhi stood firmly by Hasina’s claim that the election
under the oversight of a political party instead of a non-partisan interim
administration was crucial for Bangladesh’s democratic transition.
Bangladesh’s next election is slated for 2019. As of now, it
is not certain whether 2014 will be repeated again or not. But it is certain
that Hasina needs India’s political support. Therefore, she wants to maintain
the rapport with Narendra Modi’s government. The good thing for Hasina is that
she has been able to cut a strong image in Delhi across political parties. If
it is any indication, Modi made an exception and went to the airport to receive
Hasina.
An imbalanced quid pro quo?
Although the bilateral relationship between Bangladesh and
India is much better than any other time, problems linger. The Teesta water
share treaty is definitely a setback for future progress. Since 2008, Hasina
has met with her Indian counterparts four times. Each time Teesta was postponed
due to opposition from a provincial government in India. Therefore, the Hasina
administration faces criticism at home that her government is giving India more
than what it gets.
The growing trade deficit is also a great concern for
Bangladesh. Despite Dhaka’s repeated requests, Delhi has been tardy in relaxing
tariffs and non-tariff barriers and opening up the market of Indian provinces
bordering Bangladesh. Another thorny issue is shooting at the border by Indian
guards. The Bangladesh-India border is one of the world’s most hostile. Authorities
say almost 600 people were killed by Indian border police in the past ten
years. Unofficial estimates suggest it to be twice the official figure. India
promised to take care of this issue, but a meaningful solution is still
elusive.
As the larger neighbor, India may want to gain more from
Bangladesh. Due to the same reason, Bangladesh may very well expect India to be
more generous. How a balance can be achieved will give shape to the future
course of the bilateral relationship. Therefore, the sooner India addresses the
unresolved issues in a meaningful manner, the better for it. Perhaps, India can
take a leaf from China’s playbook in this regard.
First published in Forbes magazine, April 18, 2017
Arafat Kabir, is a Forbes contributor, a Master’s candidate
of political science at the Illinois State University. Email: arafat_kabir@ymail.com
or Tweet @ArafatKabirUpol
